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Abstract
We combine data from a eld experiment and a laboratory experiment to measure
the causal impact of human capital on respect for earned property rights, a component
of social preferences with important implications for economic growth and develop-
ment. We nd that higher academic achievement reduces the willingness of young
Kenyan women to appropriate others' labor income, and shifts players toward a 50-50
split norm in the dictator game. This study demonstrates that education may have
long-run impacts on social preferences, norms and institutions beyond the human
capital directly produced. It also shows that randomized eld experiments can be
successfully combined with laboratory experiment data to measure causal impacts on
individual values, norms, and preferences which cannot be readily captured in survey
data.
1 Introduction
Social scientists have long sought to disentangle the relationship between formal education,
cultural modernization, and economic development. In the African context, sociologists
have argued that \Western" education is associated with the adoption of modern values in-
cluding \independence from family and other traditional authority, belief in science and in
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1man's ability to control his fate, and orientation toward the future" (Armer and Youtz 1971,
p. 605). Inkeles (1969) constructs an index of individual modernity which aggregates in-
dependence from traditional sources of authority, openness to new experiences, belief in
science and modern medicine, ambition, punctuality, and civic participation; he nds that
educational attainment is the single most powerful predictor of a modern orientation in
all six countries he studies.1 More recently, Barro (1996) has shown that female educa-
tion is the strongest long-term predictor of democracy, while Mattes and Bratton (2007, p.
199) argue that education builds support for democratic institutions by \diusing values of
freedom, equality, and competition throughout the population." Whether schooling causes
such changes in cultural values is an open question; it is also possible that those with
an innately modern outlook choose to attend school, and the observed correlations result
from sample selection. More broadly, though researchers have identied a robust correla-
tion between modern cultural values and industrialization (Inglehart and Baker 2000), the
mechanisms through which such cultural changes occur remain obscure.
In this paper, we provide evidence that academic achievement, as measured by the im-
provement in test scores induced by a primary school assistance program, alters individual
values, specically moral norms governing the appropriation of others' income, as mea-
sured in an economic experiment. Thus, we provide cleaner identication of a mechanism
of cultural change than has previously been possible.
We combine a eld experiment | specically, the introduction of a scholarship program
for girls in a random sample of Kenyan primary schools | with a lab experiment designed to
measure respect for earned property rights. In 2001, the Dutch NGO ICS Africa introduced
a scholarship competition for sixth grade girls in a random sample of primary schools in
Busia District, in western Kenya, called the Girls Scholarship Program (GSP); the program
led to improvements of 0.2 standard deviations on standardized academic tests, relative to
1See also Inkeles and Smith (1974). More generally, Easterlin (1981) argues that the introduction of mass
primary education has preceded industrialization in most developed economies. Goldin and Katz (2008)
trace out how the expansion of public education contributed to the economic and social transformation of
U.S. society.
2schools in the control group (Kremer et al. 2009). Our experimental subject pool comprises
girls from the treatment and control schools in the scholarship program. The design allows
us to identify the causal impact of academic achievement on social preferences using an
instrumental variables approach, since assignment to a school in the scholarship program
(treatment group) is unrelated to baseline characteristics such as cognitive ability and
family background.2
We measure the impact of academic achievement on social preferences in an experi-
mental lab setting which allows us to turn o strategic considerations such as the fear of
social sanctions. Economic experiments are a widely used tool for measuring cross-cultural
dierences in values, norms, and beliefs that are dicult to capture in survey data. In
particular, dictator, ultimatum, and trust games have been conducted on every inhabited
continent, with subject populations ranging from university students in the United States
to hunter-gatherers in Tanzania (cf. Roth et al. 1991, Henrich et al. 2004).3 Dictator games
| in which one player (the \dictator") is provisionally allocated an amount of money, and
decides how to divide it between herself and another person (the \receiver") | measure the
willingness to share in non-strategic settings, and have been used to measure the strength
of egalitarian (or libertarian) ideals underlying perceptions of what constitutes a \fair"
distribution of income (cf. Forsythe et al. 1994, Cappelen et al. 2007, Barr et al. 2009).
We employ a variant of the dictator game designed to measure preferences governing
the distribution of earned income | specically, the willingness to appropriate another's
earnings. Homan et al. (1994) rst used earned, rather than windfall, income in dictator
games to generate an informal \property right"; they nd that enhancing dictators' sense
of entitlement via the earnings manipulation decreases generosity.4 In contrast, our design
increases the extent to which the receiver in the dictator game has property rights over the
2Friedman et al. (2010) use a similar identication strategy to explore the impact of the GSP on political
attitudes, knowledge, and behavior.
3See Henrich et al. (2010b) for an overview of the ways in which subjects in western university experi-
mental labs are not representative of humanity in general.
4Cherry (2001), Cherry et al. (2002), and List and Cherry (2008) conduct similar earnings treatments.
Konow (2000) and Cappelen et al. (2007) also explore distributional preferences governing earned income.
3budget: dictators in our experiment decide how to divide money earned by the receiver,
who was paid a piece rate for completing a repetitive task.5 Thus, our design intentionally
separates the right to determine the nal allocation | i.e. control rights, which Grossman
and Hart (1986) dene as property rights | from the \natural" but informal property
rights proposed by Locke (1980[1690]), which result from generating something through
one's own labor.6 Our specic design measures generosity toward those who have increased
social surplus through their own eort.7 The experiment was rst proposed by Jakiela
(2009), who reports that more educated Kenyan adults are signicantly more generous
than the rest of the population when deciding how to divide income earned by others,
though not in other situations. The novel research design in the current paper, exploiting
the random assignment of schools to the GSP treatment and control groups, allows us to
determine whether this association is driven by the causal impacts of schooling on social
preferences and beliefs about hard work.
Recent evidence suggests that the level of sharing observed in dictator games is strongly
associated with the extent of market integration within a community (Henrich et al. 2004,
Henrich et al. 2010a), though the underlying causal mechanism is not well understood. At
the individual level, Almas et al. (2010) report that the tendency to reward others for hard
work emerges during adolescence among Norwegian subjects: fth graders participating
in a dictator game preceded by a period of team production tended to favor egalitarian
allocations, while older subjects were more inclined to base their allocation decisions on
relative contributions to total output. Both Henrich et al. (2010a) and Almas et al. (2010)
suggest that the fairness norms invoked in dictator games are not innate, but emerge over
time through cognitive development and socialization. However, neither is able to identify
a causal mechanism to explain how and why disparate cultural norms of fairness emerge
5Rue (1998) uses a similar design.
6Building on Locke (1980[1690]), Gintis (2007) models \preinstitutional" property rights as the equilib-
rium result of the interaction between the endowment eect and possession. Following Fahr and Irlenbusch
(2000), we refer to the entitlement eect generated by our design as an \earned property right."
7The design is quite similar to a trust game involving real eort rather than investment, except that
receivers can only generate payos for themselves by \trusting" their labor income to the dictator.
4where and when they do.
Ours is one of the rst studies to use lab experimental methods to measure the impacts
of a eld experiment.8 The project is closely related to recent studies exploiting natural
experiments to show how cultural values and norms evolve. Di Tella et al. (2007) demon-
strate that the acquisition of formal land titles by squatters leads to the adoption of more
market-oriented beliefs. Employing a methodology similar to ours, Fisman et al. (2009)
combine a lab experiment with a natural experiment to show that random assignment
of Yale law students to rst year instructors trained in economics, rather than in law or
humanities elds, leads to the adoption of distributional preferences which are both more
selsh and more concerned with eciency. Our results are broadly consistent with both
studies, and highlight the extent to which life experiences shape individual preferences.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 The Field Experiment
We exploit exogenous variation in academic achievement induced by a eld experiment |
the Girl's Scholarship Program (GSP) | in western Kenya in 2001 and 2002 (Kremer et al.
2009). The GSP was an education initiative for sixth grade girls enrolled in primary schools
near Busia, Kenya. Sixty-nine area schools were randomly assigned to either the treatment
or the control group; in schools assigned to the treatment group, ICS awarded scholarships
to girls among the top fteen percent of performers on a government-administered practice
test for the primary school exit exam (the Kenyan Certicate of Primary Education, or
KCPE)9. Scholarship recipients received an annual cash grant of approximately $12.80
8Fearon et al. (2009) use public goods games to measure the impact of a post-conict community
development initiative on social cohesion in Liberian villages. In addition, recent work by Paluck and
Green (2009) demonstrates that randomized experiments can be used to demonstrate the ecacy of policies
explicitly intended to change cultural norms.
9Another randomized experiment was simultaneously conducted in neighboring Teso district (Kremer et
al. 2009), but since it is unclear whether the scholarship increased human capital in this district, follow-up
surveys were only conducted in the Busia district. For that reason, we only have actual KCPE scores for
Busia students, and we focus only on that experiment in this paper.
5(1000 Kenyan shillings) and had their school fees paid for the two years after they won the
competition; winners were also recognized at a public awards ceremony. ICS administered
the competition in both 2001 and 2002, so two cohorts of girls received awards.
Girls in GSP treatment schools had practice exam scores over 0.2 standard deviations
higher than those in control schools, and we show that they ultimately scored higher on the
actual KCPE exam. As a result, assignment to a GSP treatment school is an instrument
for academic achievement as measured by KCPE performance. Performance on the KCPE
is a particularly salient measure of academic success, since it determines whether or not a
student will be admitted to a government secondary school.10 Though only girls scoring
near the top of the distribution were eligible for scholarships, the GSP program led to
test score improvements at all performance levels, and among boys (who were ineligible for
scholarships). The program also led to increases in teacher attendance, which may partially
explain the diusion of benets (Kremer et al. 2009).
Between 2005 and 2008, an extensive follow-up survey was administered to 1,864 girls
from GSP treatment and control schools in Busia District. The GSP Survey sample includes
all girls in the GSP cohorts who could be located at the time of the follow-up survey.
The eective tracking rate is 80 percent, and attrition from the survey does not dier
substantially between the GSP treatment and control groups (Friedman et al. 2010).
2.2 The Lab Experiment
We conduct a lab experiment to measure respect for earned property rights among girls
in the GSP treatment and control groups to test whether academic achievement alters in-
dividuals' social preferences. Our experiment is a variant of the dictator game, in which
one player divides a xed budget between herself and another player.11 We conduct an
\eort-taking" game in which dictators divide money earned by other players within the
10Ozier (2010) reports that scoring above the mean on the KCPE increases the probability of completing
secondary school by 20 percentage points.
11The dictator game was rst proposed by Forsythe et al. (1994). Camerer (2003) summarizes the use
of the dictator game in experimental economics.
6experiment.12 Homan et al. (1994), Cherry (2001), Cherry et al. (2002), and List and
Cherry (2008) conduct dictator games involving earned income; these authors nd that
dictators are less generous with their own earnings than with windfall income. Jakiela
(2009) conducts standard dictator games over both earned and unearned income and tak-
ing variants with rural villagers in western Kenya. She nds that Kenyan subjects who
have completed some secondary school are signicantly more generous than other Kenyan
subjects in contexts where eort by other players determines the size of the pie, though not
in other contexts. In other words, more educated subjects appear more inclined to reward
eort by others.13
In the present study, we conduct a real eort \taking" dictator game designed to mea-
sure respect for earned property rights. Players were randomly assigned to one of two
rooms, and each was matched with a partner in the other room. Partners' identities were
not revealed to subjects during or after the experiment. Players performed a task for ten
minutes, and were paid a piece rate based on their level of production. Each player's anony-
mous partner then decided how to divide the players' earning between the two of them.
Thus, each dictator divided a budget that was earned by her partner.
In our execution of the experiment, instructions were presented orally, after which all
participants briey practiced the piece rate task. We selected an activity which could be
easily understood by all subjects, regardless of educational attainment, and which would
allow players to increase their output by exerting greater eort up to some maximum
feasible level: subjects earned money by clicking a handheld tally counter and they were
12The \eort-taking" dictator game treatment was proposed by Jakiela (2009), and built on the \taking
games" employed by Greig (2006). It is similar to the design used by Rue (1998), who awarded dictators
a large (small) budget if the recipient did (or did not) perform well enough on a general knowledge quiz.
Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) conduct related variants of the dictator game which allow for both giving
and taking. We also conducted the three other variants of the dictator game proposed by Jakiela (2009), but
because these are less directly related to respect for earned property rights, and because our instrumental
variable is not valid within the subject pools from those games, we focus solely on the eort-taking variant
in this paper.
13She also reports that Kenyan villagers are, on average, less generous with their own earned income
than with windfall income, but are not more generous with others (in taking games) who have earned
income rather than receiving an unearned windfall; moreover, this pattern contrasts with the behavior of
subjects in a standard university experimental lab in the United States.
7paid based on the number of times they clicked within ten minutes.14 After practicing the
task for two minutes, every subject decided how she would play the dictator game using
the strategy method: each subject recorded her allocation decisions in a booklet which
listed all the feasible budgets which could be earned by her partner. Subjects then had
ten minutes in which to earn money by clicking the tally counter. Subjects' accumulated
30 Kenyan shillings (approximately $0.375) for every 200 times they clicked; this money
was subsequently divided between each subject and her partner according to the decision
rule the partner had chosen. Following the experiment, each subject lled out a short
questionnaire, and then received their payment in private immediately before departing.
2.3 Experimental Subjects
We recruited girls from the GSP treatment and control groups to participate in the eort-
taking dictator game. Our main sample includes data on 101 subjects who report KCPE
scores in the GSP Follow-up Survey. We did not attempt to recruit a representative sample
of GSP Survey respondents since those who had moved out of the area were unlikely to
return just to participate in our experiment; instead, we worked with local village ocials
to compile a list of girls who had not permanently migrated out of their home district.15
Moreover, since our measure of academic achievement is only available for girls who com-
pleted eighth grade and took the KCPE exit exam, only these individuals are included in
our sample. We choose to focus KCPE score, rather than educational attainment, since the
latter is censored: 72 of our 101 subjects are still in school. Random assignment to a GSP
treatment school is associated with an additional 0:358 years of schooling, on average, but
the impact is not statistically signicant (p-value 0:211). Moreover, test scores are arguably
14In contrast to many \real eort" experiments, we opted for a non-cognitive task so that output would
reveal minimal information about education or innate intelligence. The task was inspired by Ariely et
al. (2009), but adapted to a non-computerized environment. Other non-cognitive tasks which have been
used in experimental settings include stung envelopes (Konow 2000, Falk and Ichino 2006) and cracking
walnuts (Fahr and Irlenbusch 2000).
15Friedman et al. (2010) nd no evidence that the GSP increased the probability of migrating out of
one's home district.
8more relevant as an indicator of quality, rather than quantity of education: Barro (2001)
and Hanushek and Kimko (2000) both nd that test scores on internationally comparable
exams are more predictive of future growth rates than years of schooling.
Table 1 compares our subject pool to the sub-sample of GSP Survey respondents who
ever took the KCPE exam. While our sample is not representative of the overall GSP
Survey sample, it is broadly representative of the proportion of the larger GSP Survey
sample who took the KCPE exam. Although no characteristics are statistically signicant
at 95% condence, our subjects are somewhat less likely to come from a GSP treatment
school (p-value 0:056) and are about three months younger (p-value 0:090) than other GSP
respondents who completed the KCPE exam (Table 1). However, there are no signicant
dierences between our sample and other respondents who took the KCPE in terms of
educational attainment, household assets, parents' education, or cognitive ability. Thus,
we believe our sample is broadly representative of the sub-population that completed eighth
grade and took the exit exam.
Table 2 compares the GSP treatment and control groups within our sample in terms
of baseline characteristics before the GSP was implemented. Those in the GSP treatment
group are not signicantly dierent from the control group in terms of age or parents'
education. Given the randomized design and the absence of dierences between the treat-
ment and control groups at baseline, behavior within the experiment can be attributed to
the impact of the GSP program, and the gains in academic performance it generated, on
individual social preferences.
3 Results
Our main sample includes data from 101 subjects, each of whom made thirty allocation
decisions. On average, subjects allocated their partners 32.9 percent of the budget and
retained 67.1 for themselves (Table 3). This mean level of generosity is higher than in
most standard dictator games (Camerer 2003), which is to be expected given the \taking"
9context. The distribution has modes at 0 and 50 percent. 5 percent of subjects took the
entire budget for themselves, while 13.7 percent split the money evenly and an additional
14.9 percent allocated more than half the money to their partners. Subjects with some
secondary schooling allocated their partners slightly more than those who did not (33.6
versus 31.4 percent of the budget, p-value 0:0226, results not shown). There are clear
dierences between the GSP treatment and control groups in terms of behavior within
the experiment. The two groups are equally likely to keep everything for themselves, but
subjects drawn from the GSP treatment group are substantially more likely to divide the
budget evenly (19.2 percent of subjects versus 9.3 percent) or to allocate their partners
more than half the budget (16.8 percent versus 13.3 percent). This is our rst piece of
evidence that the GSP program impacted individual social preferences.
Our main analysis measures the causal impact of academic performance on social pref-
erences, measured by sharing within the dictator game, using random assignment to the
GSP treatment group as an instrument for the KCPE score (Table 4). Our key outcome
variable is the share of the total budget that the dictator allocates to her partner, which
we term the \partner share." We rst report linear IV specications (Panel A, Columns
1{3), reduced form OLS specications (Panel B, Columns 1{3), and the IV rst stage
(Panel C, Columns 1{3). The IV estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase
in a student's KCPE score is associated with a large and statistically signicant increase
in partner share. Without any regression controls, the coecient on instrumented KCPE
score is 10.6, and is signicant at 90 percent condence. After adding controls for age,
ethnicity, and session-room xed eects, the coecient remains almost unchanged at to
10.3 and the condence level increases to 95 percent (Table 4, Panel A, Columns 1{3).16
Compared to an average partner share of 32.9 percent of the budget, this is a large eect.
This corresponds to an approximately 6 percentage point average GSP treatment eect
16Age controls include both age in 2008 (normalized) and an indicator for being in the rst GSP cohort.
Studies by Fehr et al. (2008), Almas et al. (2010), Bekkers (2007), and Fowler (2006) suggest that age is
an important predictor of altruistic behaviors. Ethnicity controls are indicators for being a member of a
minority ethnic group (Teso or Luo) and for belonging to a local minority subgroup of the dominant Luhya
ethnic group.
10shown in the reduced form specications (Panel B, Columns 1{3).
Panel C shows that the F-statistic in the rst stage is between 5.3 and 6.3 depending
on the controls, and that random assignment to the GSP program increases subsequent
KCPE scores by an average of 0.6 to 0.7 standard deviations within our sample.17 Though
our rst stage F-statistics are below the rule of thumb proposed in Staiger and Stock
(1997), the coecient of interest is median-unbiased in the just-identied case (Angrist and
Pischke 2009); nonetheless, hypothesis tests may be incorrectly sized (Stock and Yogo 2002,
Dufour 1997). Anderson and Rubin (1949) provides a statistic that produces condence
intervals of the correct size in the presence of weak instruments. These condence regions
are asymmetric and potentially disjoint or unbounded, but the AR statistic allows us to
verify that our results are not dependent on inappropriately small Wald standard errors.
With no controls or with age and ethnicity controls, the coecient on the endogenous
regressor KCPE score is borderline signicant under the AR 2 test with a p-value of
6.4 and 6.3% respectively, and with additional room xed eects, it is highly signicant
with a p-value of 0.3%. The 95% AR condence intervals are, respectively, (-0.90,48.45),
(-0.71,31.40), and (3.56,42.83). Although these barely include 0 in the rst two cases,
overall the AR test merely shows that we can't reject even larger eects, as the asymmetric
condence intervals are skewed upwards compared to the standard condence intervals.
This strongly suggests that our result is not a spurious consequence of a weak instrument.
Figure 1 shows our main result graphically via non-parametric, locally-weighted Fan
regressions: the partner share function for participants in the GSP treatment group lies
almost entirely above the partner share function for those in the control group.18
We further explore the impact of academic achievement on preferences for sharing by
estimated IV probit specications where the outcome variable is an indicator for splitting
the budget exactly evenly (Table 4, Panel A, columns 4-6). In all specications, instru-
17This GSP treatment eect on test scores is larger than the roughly 0.4 standard deviations eect
reported in Friedman (2010) for the full GSP Follow-up Survey sample. Sampling variation is a likely
explanation for the discrepancy, given our limited subsample of 101 lab subjects.
18Following Deaton (1997), we choose a reasonable bandwith by trial and error, since the gure is for
illustrative purposes only.
11mented test scores are positively and statistically signicantly associated with a tendency
to divide the budget evenly. Thus, the impact of academic achievement is not simply
greater generosity, but a clear tenancy to shift toward an exactly equal distribution of the
budget.
4 Discussion
Table 5 shows that un-instrumented academic achievement on the KCPE exam is asso-
ciated with increased generosity in the eort-taking dictator game (Panel A). However,
the coecient on KCPE score is substantially smaller than in the IV regressions discussed
above.19 It is not surprising that the coecients are dierent, since academic outcomes
depend on factors such as parental inuence or socioeconomic status which may also shape
norms and preferences, as discussed in Malmendier and Nagel (2009).
The fact that the OLS coecient is smaller suggests that some factors which explain
academic performance are associated with lower levels of respect for earned property rights,
or possibly that the IV approach is helping to address attenuation bias caused by noise in
the KCPE achievement test score. A further possibility that we cannot rule out is that
the GSP experiment aects social preferences through educational channels other than the
test score, with schooling attainment being the leading potential channel, and that the IV
estimates are in part capturing eects through these other channels. While this possibility
somewhat alters the interpretation on the KCPE coecient estimates, the hypothesized
schooling attainment channel is still consistent with the overall thrust of our argument
that boosting human capital aects social preferences. Those readers who believe that
schooling attainment is a major channel through which the scholarship program aects
social preferences thus might prefer to focus on the reduced form results in Panel B rather
than the IV results in Panel A.
19A Hausman test rejects the equality of the IV and OLS coecients with 90 percent condence (p-value
0:065) when the full set of controls is included in the regressions, as in column 3.
12There are several possible channels through which human capital could increase giving
in our experiment. First, human capital may directly alter social preferences, as we have
argued. In an educational environment where eort is rewarded and the benets from
eort are privately held, one might learn to embrace the values that lead to success in that
environment. A related possibility is that success in school is a signal for success later in
life, and after observing this signal, students choose self-serving moral codes: those who are
capable of high productivity adopt norms that reward high productivity. Either pathway
might explain a causal impact of academic achievement on individual beliefs about what
constitutes a fair allocation, particularly in settings where individual eort determines
income.20
Alternatively, people might choose allocations based on their beliefs about the types of
individuals they are likely to be matched with: in other words, individuals with dierent
beliefs about the average level of altruism and respect for property rights in the population
(or the experimental subject pool) might behave dierently in our experiment even if
their underlying preferences were the same.21 If school exposes individuals to a dierent
peer group than exists outside of the academic environment, academic achievement may
predict generosity in our experiment because beliefs about other players are dierent, even
if reciprocal social preferences (conditional on beliefs) are the same.
To explore the hypothesis that beliefs, rather than preferences, change with academic
experience, we asked participants to report how much they thought the dictator allocated
to them at four of the twenty possible budget sizes.22 Table 5 reports OLS regressions of
the average amount a subject believed her partner would allocate her on the KCPE score
20It is also possible that winning the scholarship contest impacted individual preferences via a channel
other than academic achievement, for example, through an increase in generalized reciprocity. To explore
this possibility, we estimated our main regression specications omitting the fteen subjects who won the
scholarship contest. Though sample sizes, and consequently signicance levels, are reduced, estimated
coecients are essentially unchanged.
21Levine (1998) proposes a model of altruism and spite along these lines.
22Beliefs were elicited through survey questions and not in an incentive-compatible manner. However,
the average belief reported in the survey is not signicantly associated with the average amount a subject
allocated to her partner. Moreover, beliefs are substantially higher, on average, than actual allocations,
while a theory of cognitive dissonance would predict the opposite.
13(Panel B), both with and without controls. Academic achievement is not signicantly
associated with beliefs in any specication. Moreover, the point estimates are negative:
test scores are, if anything, negatively related to beliefs about the prevalence of respect for
earned property rights. We are consequently able to rule out the possibility that academic
achievement impacts beliefs rather than social preferences.
5 Conclusion
We provide evidence that greater human capital, as captured in academic achievement
tests, alters individual values, generating greater respect for earned property rights. This
nding demonstrates that formal education has cultural impacts beyond the direct pro-
duction of human capital, and may have social returns beyond whatever wage gains the
human capital generates. Though there is an extensive empirical literature exploring the
labor market returns to education in less developed countries (cf. Duo 2001), relatively
few empirical studies have tested the claims of modernization theory | that formal ed-
ucation leads to changes in individual values | with convincing research designs. Such
cultural change could benet society in several ways. First, as individuals become more
respectful of property rights and more permissive of earned wealth accumulation, the pri-
vate returns to entrepreneurship may increase. This may be particularly important in rural
villages in Africa, where strong egalitarian traditions often lead to the social sanctioning
against households that accumulate wealth (Barr and Stein 2008, Platteau 2000). More
speculatively, the expansion of educational opportunities may generate positive spillovers
if changes in values facilitate the emergence of market-oriented institutions (Bernard et
al. 2010). At the same time, education may have impacts on individual values and be-
liefs other than those documented here; for example, academic success may change later
individual aspirations, and these in turn may inuence long-run outcomes (Ray 2006).
Our work complements recent cross-cultural comparisons documenting the correlation
between market integration and generosity within dictator games (Henrich et al. 2001,
14Henrich et al. 2010a), and contributes to the emerging literature documenting the causal
mechanisms underlying changes in individual values (Di Tella et al. 2007, Fisman et al.
2009). From a methodological perspective, we use a novel hybrid approach to demonstrate
that lab experiments can be combined with eld experiments to measure the direct impact
of programs on individual preferences and values. In response to recent calls for a greater
focus on understanding why and how (rather than just whether) anti-poverty programs
work, we demonstrate that the testing of theoretical models which is so often the focus
of lab experiments can t naturally together with the clean econometric identication
generated by randomized trials.
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19Table 1: Summary Statistics: Subjects vs. Rest of GSP Sample
Lab Experimental Subjects? (S = 0;1) S = 0 S = 1 Dierence
N 1024 101
First KCPE score (among those who took exam) 258.276 259.604 -1.328
(1.392) (4.430) (4.643)
Change in test scores during GSP -0.011 -0.001 -0.011
(0.026) (0.076) (0.081)
Highest grade completed 8.602 8.426 0.176
(0.028) (0.127) (0.130)
Age 20.161 19.901 0.260
(0.045) (0.145) (0.152)
Ravens matrices score 20.727 21.538 -0.810
(0.169) (0.622) (0.644)
English vocabulary score 9.939 10.089 -0.151
(0.080) (0.245) (0.258)
Swahili vocabulary score 9.478 9.812 -0.334
(0.081) (0.254) (0.267)
Respondent held job in last 12 months 1.881 1.871 0.010
(0.010) (0.033) (0.035)
GSP Treatment Group 0.546 0.446 0.100
(0.016) (0.050) (0.052)
Father's education 9.786 10.420 -0.634
(0.133) (0.395) (0.417)
Mother's education 7.301 7.263 0.038
(0.132) (0.415) (0.435)
Household size 6.951 6.812 0.139
(0.088) (0.283) (0.297)
Household Assets (1000s of KSh) 27.727 30.095 -2.369
(0.545) (1.718) (1.802)
Note: standard deviations in parentheses in columns 1 and 2, and standard errors in parentheses
in column 3.    indicates signicance at the 99 percent level;  indicates signicance at the
95 percent level; and  indicates signicance at the 90 percent level. The number of observations
contributing to each number may dier from the pool sizes shown when particular variables are
unavailable for some people
20Table 2: Summary Statistics: GSP Treatment vs. Control
GSP Treatment Group? (T = 0;1) Both T = 0 T = 1 Difference
N 101 56 45
Age 19.901 19.696 20.156 0.459
(0.145) (0.185) (0.227) (0.293)
Baseline father's education 11.631 11.469 11.788 0.319
(0.404) (0.596) (0.555) (0.814)
Baseline mother's education 9.574 9.733 9.419 -0.314
(0.487) (0.733) (0.655) (0.984)
Baseline practice KCPE score 0.077 -0.003 0.219 0.223
(0.098) (0.117) (0.175) (0.210)
Note: standard deviations in parentheses in columns 1, 2 and 3, and standard errors in paren-
theses in column 4. *** indicates signicance at the 99 percent level; ** indicates signicance
at the 95 percent level; and * indicates signicance at the 90 percent level. The number of
observations contributing to each number may dier from the pool sizes shown when particular
variables are unavailable for some people.
Table 3: Reduced Form GSP Impacts
GSP Treatment Group? (T = 0;1) Both T = 0 T = 1 Difference
Partner share 32.865 30.029 36.394 6.365
(0.462) (0.606) (0.695) (0.922)
Gave nothing 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Gave exactly half of budget 0.137 0.093 0.192 0.099
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016)
Gave more than half of budget 0.149 0.133 0.168 0.035
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016)
Note: standard deviations in parentheses in columns 1, 2 and 3, and standard errors in paren-
theses in column 4. *** indicates signicance at the 99 percent level; ** indicates signicance
at the 95 percent level; and * indicates signicance at the 90 percent level. The number of
observations contributing to each number may dier from the pool sizes shown when particular
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 5: Association between text scores and expected and actual partner share
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Partner Share
KCPE Score 3.100 4.283 3.380
(1.416) (1.532) (1.248)
Budget 0.028 0.028 0.028
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Constant 31.973 31.737 42.790
(1.599) (3.773) (3.744)
Observations 2020 2020 2020
R2 0.023 0.063 0.175
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Expectations
KCPE Score -0.744 -1.283 -1.705
(1.651) (1.675) (1.662)
Constant 47.024 45.235 46.087
(1.233) (1.951) (3.550)
Observations 1960 1960 1960
R2 0.003 0.041 0.103
Age Controls No Yes Yes
Ethnicity Controls No Yes Yes
Rooms FEs No No Yes
All specications estimated using OLS and robust standard errors
clustered by school  GSP cohort, the unit of randomization in
the GSP. Coecients signicantly nonzero at .99 (***), .95 (**)
and .90 (*) condence levels.
23Figure 1: Fan regressions of Partner Share on Budget
24